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THE LOUISIANA TEACHERS' TENURE ACT-PROTECTION
FROM DIsMIssAL FOR STRIKING TEACHERS?
The power to employ and dismiss teachers rests with the parish school
board and cannot be delegated.' The Louisiana Teachers' Tenure Act
protects permanent 2 teachers from removal as a result of "political venge-
ance and reprisals ' 3 by limiting the grounds for dismissal to incompetency,
dishonesty, willful neglect of duty, and membership in any group prohibited
from operating in Louisiana. 4 A permanent teacher is entitled to a copy
of the specific charges and the reasons for them at least twenty days in
advance of a school board hearing, and may request that the hearing be
either public or private. She may also have counsel and witnesses present
during the hearing.'
Before a permanent teacher may be dismissed or disciplined, a school
board must find her guilty of one of the specified charges. The teacher
can then apply for a full court hearing within one year of the school
board's finding. The reviewing court is given the power to affirm or reverse
the action of the school board6 and to order the teacher reinstated with
full benefits restored, including full pay for loss of time or salary.'
This comment examines the extent to which the Tenure Act protects
striking teachers from dismissal. A school board may bring a charge of
"willful neglect of duty," one of the specified grounds for dismissal under
the act,' against teachers who refuse to work. A public policy favoring
Copyright 1987, by LoUISIA LAW REviEw.
1. La. Const. art. VIlI, § 3(A) provides that the State Board of Elementary and
Secondary Education has no control over the selection or removal of school board officers
and employees. See Johnson v. Board of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 414 So. 2d
352 (La. 1982).
2. A permanent (tenured) teacher is one who has served three years or more as a
teacher. A temporary (probationary) teacher is one who has served less than three years.
A probationary teacher may be discharged upon written recommendation of the super-
intendent accompanied by valid reasons. Unless the school board notifies a probationary
teacher of his dismissal, he is automatically deemed tenured at the expiration of three
years. La. R.S. 17:442 (1982).
3. Kennington v. Red River Parish School Bd., 200 So. 514, 516 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1940); Reed v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 21 So. 2d 895 (La. App. Orl. 1945).
4. La. R.S. 17:443(A) (1982).
5. Id.
6. Arbitrary and capricious actions by the board are grounds for reversal.
7. La. R.S. 17:443(B) (1982).
8. The causes of removal of a teacher-willful neglect of duty, incompetency, dis-
honesty, and membership in a prohibited group-are exclusive. Gassen v. St. Charles
Parish School Bd., 199 La. 954, 963, 7 So. 2d 217, 220 (1942); State ex rel. Penny v.
Rapides Parish School Bd., I So. 2d 334, 335 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941); Kennington, 200
So. at 516-17.
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the right of public employees to engage in a work stoppage in the context
of a labor dispute may affect a reviewing court's conclusion concerning
a school board decision to dismiss a striking teacher. Although the right
of public employees to strike has not been expressly addressed by statute
in Louisiana, recent jurisprudence indicates that not all strikes by such
employees are illegal. This comment examines the legal relationship between
"willful neglect of duty" and the jurisprudential recognition of teachers'
right to strike.
THE MEANING OF WILLFUL NEGLECT OF DUTY
Courts regularly state that the provision in the Teachers' Tenure
Act providing for a "full hearing to review the action of the school
board" is to be interpreted in favor of discharged teachers. 9 However,
the scope of review is limited. The questions for the court on review
are 1) whether the act of the school board was arbitrary or capricious,
and 2) whether the board's decision was based on substantial evidence.
In cases where teachers have refused to report for work in a non-labor
dispute context, reviewing courts have upheld school board orders of
dismissal for willful neglect of duty as a rational exercise of the board's
exclusive power to dismiss employees of the school system.' 0 The dis-
missal of a teacher is largely within the sound discretion of the school
board under the Teachers' Tenure Act, and unless he can clearly show
that the board has abused its discretion, the courts will not interfere."
The following cases illustrate factual situations in which teachers were
dismissed for willful neglect of duty.
In order to find a teacher guilty of willful neglect of duty, the
evidence before the board must establish that the teacher violated a
school policy of which she was aware. In Cunningham v. Franklin
Parish School Board,12 the board dismissed a tenured teacher for willful
neglect of duty. On one occasion, the teacher had left her classroom
unattended, locking three pre-school handicapped children in the room.
On another, she had missed her classes without permission and without
obtaining a substitute. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed
9. The provisions of the act must be liberally construed in favor of the class for
whose benefit the act was passed. Lea v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 228 La. 987, 84
So. 2d 610 (1955).
10. See, e.g., Hamberlin v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 210 La. 483, 27 So. 2d
307 (1946); Wiley v. Richland Parish School Bd., 476 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1985); Mims v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 315 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1975).
11. State ex rel. Piper v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 213 La. 885, 35 So.
2d 804 (1948). See Note, Teachers' Tenure Law-Necessity for a Hearing on an Involuntary
Transfer, 15 Loy. L. Rev. 200 (1968-69).
12. 457 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
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the dismissal, holding that a rational basis existed for the board's action
and that the teacher had sufficient notice of the board's policy. The
court had no difficulty in equating the teacher's actions with neglect of
duty: "A school system could not operate efficiently if its teachers were
permitted to miss their classes without permission and without making
arrangements for a substitute in order to take care of personal business,
however worthy it might be." 3
The teacher contended that her actions could not be deemed "will-
ful" as required under the Act in the absence of a prior warning of
the provisions of the Act. The court disagreed, however, recognizing.
that a warning is not required in situations where a teacher, merely by
the nature of her position, should be aware of the impropriety of the
practice. The requirement that teachers be present to conduct their classes
is such a basic and essential ingredient of a smooth-functioning school
system that the board need not provide a warning of the consequences
of the violation of such a policy.
Applying the Cunningham court's rationale to the context of a labor
dispute, a striking teacher who blatantly refuses to conduct her classes
obviously has not obtained permission from the board, nor has she
obtained a substitute. Indeed, the presence of either of these two factors
would effectively negate any impact that the strike might have on ne-
gotiations between teachers and the board. In a labor dispute context,
willful violation of board policy is intended to disrupt the efficiency of
the school system, thereby creating an incentive for the board to address
the teachers' grievances. The Tenure Act, however, makes no distinction
between neglect of duty for private reasons and neglect of duty intended
as a concerted effort to achieve better working conditions and salary
improvement. Thus, past interpretation of the Tenure Act affords a
tenured teacher no protection from dismissal while participating in a
work stoppage. Only a statutory or jurisprudential right of absence from
work would override the board's duty to keep the schools operating.
In Slaughter v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 14 the school
board dismissed a teacher for willful neglect of duty when she failed
to report to a different school. After teaching for nine years at the
same school, the school board approved her principal's recommendation
for transfer to another school due to a personality conflict. Later at-
tempts by the board to reach a compromise more agreeable to the
teacher were fruitless.
When the teacher failed to report to her new school on the date
ordered, the superintendent warned her by letter that dismissal pro-
13. Id. at 188. See Simon v. Jefferson Davis Parish School Bd., 289 So. 2d 511
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
14. 432 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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ceedings would commence if she failed to report for work within one
week. The teacher chose to ignore the warning, and, following a tenure
hearing, the board voted to dismiss her. After initially determining that
the board had authority to order the teacher's transfer,15 the court in
Slaughter reasoned that a school board may validly order an employee
to report for duty. The teacher's failure to report to work after the
order was given thus became a willful neglect of the teacher's duty to
obey board directives rather than a simple absence from work. A teacher
must abide by reasonable orders from the board or be subject to a
charge of willful neglect of duty.
One typical school board response to the disruption caused by a
strike is to order the teachers to return to work.' 6'If refusing to obey
a board order to return to work constitutes a per se willful neglect of
duty, as Slaughter suggests, then teachers can be found guil ty and
dismissed at a later tenure hearing on this basis alone. The issue of
whether the teachers' grievances justified the abandonment of their duties
might not be addressed.
Other alternatives might be employed by a school board when faced
with a teacher's absence without official leave. Depending on the cir-
cumstances, the board could characterize the absence either as a voluntary
abandonment of the teacher's position or as a voluntary resignation
from her employment. The board's choice in labeling the teacher's action
affects the teacher's right to a hearing under the Tenure Act.
Where a tenured teacher fails to report for work and cannot be
contacted, a school board might infer that ihe teacher has voluntarily
abandoned her position. If, in addition, the teacher changes residence
and leaves no forwarding address, it would be logical to assume she
no longer has an interest in her employment. Under these circumstances,
the school board may either bring charges of willful neglect of duty or
assume that the teacher intended to resign.
The Tenure Act's procedural protections are triggered only by school
board actions to dismiss or demote a tenured teacher. If a school board
chooses to dismiss a teacher who has voluntarily abandoned her position,
the statutory procedure must be followed regardless of whether the
teacher actually receives notice of the hearing. 7 A teacher's response to
15. In Rosenthal v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 214 So. 2d 203, 207 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1968), the court set forth four conditions under which a transfer may be a "removal":
1) where a reduction in salary is involved; 2) where the new position requires the teaching
of subjects for which the teacher is not qualified; 3) where the teacher must undergo
additional training; and 4) where the transfer follows a dismissal without formal charges,
or a hearing, and thus leaves a blot on the teacher's record.
16. See D. Colton and E. Graber, Teacher Strikes and the Courts (1982).
17. For example, in 1971, the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board attempted to
notify a teacher of her right to appear at a hearing on charges of incompetency. Although
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the notice will dispel the assumption that she no longer has any interest
in her employment and that she has, therefore, voluntarily abandoned
her employment. Where the teacher does not respond, the hearing may
still proceed in her absence. In either case, the teacher was offered the
opportunity to be heard, and the school board is protected if the teacher
later returns and seeks reinstatement.
A school board's interpretation of an abandonment as an implied
resignation, however, affords the teacher no protection under the Tenure
Act. A resignation is not an action initiated by the board for dismissal
or demotion. Resignation procedures are not delineated by state statute.
Therefore, individual school boards set their own policies on the manner
of tendering resignations.
Typically, a school board should require that a resignation be in
writing and formally accepted by the board in order to become effective.'
This policy protects the board when a teacher later attempts to withdraw
her resignation. In cases of emergency, such as sudden illness, a board
might accept an oral resignation on condition that it be confirmed later
in writing.' 9 A board acting on an oral statement of intent alone accepts
the risk that the teacher may later seek reinstatement. Should the board
fail to prove the teacher resigned, then its action could only be interpreted
as a dismissal without due process and in violation of the Tenure Act
requirements.
A teacher who evidences a lack of interest in employment by failing
to report to work and moving out of the school district has commu-
nicated no express intent, oral or written, to resign from his employment.
A board accepting such a resignation by implication exposes itself to
the same risks as when the teacher's resignation is oral. The teacher
could return, seek reinstatement, and argue that the board's action
constituted a dismissal in violation of the Tenure Act, entitling her to
reinstatement.
In certain circumstances, however, a reviewing court might find a
board's acceptance of a teacher's tacit resignation valid. A total lack
of interest in her position together with actions inconsistent with her
intent to remain employed, such as obtaining a different employer, may
be viewed as providing the school board with a rational basis for inferring
resignation.
the Post Office notified the teacher three times that she had a registered letter in her
mailbox, she did not actually receive and sign for the letter until one day after her
dismissal. State Times, February 12, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
18. Written resignations are strongly encouraged because of later difficulties which
arise when an employee wishes to withdraw the resignation.
19. Id. The safer approach followed by board attorneys is to commence a formal
dismissal hearing in compliance with the Tenure Act.
19871
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A striking teacher voluntarily abandons her post in response to her
dissatisfaction with the conditions of her employment. Despite this ac-
tion, the economic and emotional costs associated with concerted work
stoppages are too high to the striking teacher for a school board ra-
tionally to believe that she no longer wishes to work. In this situation,
a school board declaration proclaiming the resignation of all absent
teachers is tantamount to a dismissal. The procedural safeguards em-
bodied in the Tenure Act should be utilized to protect striking teachers,
most of whom fervently hope that their actions will enable them to
return to their duties soon. A subjective intent to resign cannot rea-
sonably be inferred from a teacher's participation in a strike action.
THE LEGALITY OF TEACHERS' STRIKES
American law views public sector strikes in a manner substantially
different from strikes in the private sector.20 Although Congress has
regulated private sector and federal employee labor relations, its legis-
lation has not extended to state, county, or municipal employees. 21
Consequently, public employee strikes have been regulated by the states
through grants of the right to strike to nonessential employees and
through legislative silence. 22
Prohibition of Public Employee Strikes
At common law, the Sovereignty Doctrine recognized the right of
the sovereign to prohibit strikes by public employees. 23 Today, strikes
by public employees are illegal either by statute or at common law in
most states. 24 A strike by employees of the United States government
is a crime. 25
The denial of the right to strike to public employees is principally
based on the view that such strikes are incompatible with the proper
functioning of government. Public employees serve the public welfare;
20. See Hanslowe and Acierno, The Law and Theory of Strikes by Government
Employees, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 1055 (1982).
21. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982), as
amended by the Labor Managment Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1982),
governs private sector employees. Federal employees are regulated by 5 U.S.C. §§ 7301-
52 (1976).
22. See Comment, Damage Liability of Public Employee Unions for Illegal Strikes,
23 B.C.L. Rev. 1087 (1982).
23. See, e.g., City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131
A.2d 59 (1957); City of Cleveland v. Division 268 of Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees
of America, 41 Ohio Op. 236, 90 N.E.2d 711 (C.P. 1949).
24. See infra note 34 for a listing of some exceptions.
25. 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1982).
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thus, a public employee strike is a contravention of the public welfare
and the equivalent of a denial of governmental authority. 2
6
The view that public employee strikes distort the democratic process
forms another basis for the prohibition. If, in addition to the usual
methods of political pressure, unions are able to strike, then collective
bargaining would improperly skew the results of the American political
process .27
In the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting strikes by public
sector employees, most courts have denied public employees the right
to strike under the common law rule. 28 In Norwalk Teachers' Association
v. Board of Education,29 the plaintiff teachers' union sought a declaratory
judgment as to whether its members could engage in a concerted work
stoppage. The court answered the question in the negative. Even in the
absence of a prohibitory statute, the court held that public employees,
as agents of the government and exercising some part of the sovereignty
entrusted to it, have no right to strike.
At the time Norwalk was decided, commentators were unanimous
in their opinion that public employee strikes were unthinkable and
intolerable.30 Three presidents had made strong public statements con-
demning strikes by public employees.3 For example, in commenting on
a Boston police strike, Calvin Coolidge stated: "There is no right to
strike against public safety by anybody anywhere at any time." '3 2 The
Norwalk decision may thus be viewed as the natural result of the
overwhelming disapproval of public employee strikes by commentators,
executives, and the judiciary.
Statutory Right to Strike
Ten states grant public employees the right to strike as part of a
comprehensive collective bargaining scheme to regulate public employee
26. Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
See Hanslowe and Acierno, supra note 20, at 1061.
27. Wellington and Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment,
78 Yale L.J. 1107, 1123 (1969).
28. See Potts v. Hay, 229 Ark. 830, 318 S.W.2d 826 (1958); City of Manchester,
100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59 (1957); Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n, 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d
482 (1951).
29. 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
30. See 1 L. Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining § 171 (Supp. 1943);
Note, Labor-Collective Bargaining Rights of Governmental Employees-Checkoff, 94 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 427 (1946).
31. President Wilson characterized a Boston police strike as "an intolerable crime
against civilization." See Vogel, What About the Rights of the Public Employee?, 1 Lab.
L.J. 604, 612 (1950). President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated in 1937 that 'militant tactics
have no place in the functions of any organization of government employees."' Id. (quoting
letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the President of the National Federation
of Federal Employees (Aug. 16, 1937)).
32. Id.
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relations. 3 The grant is typically limited, however, in two ways. In some
states, only certain categories of public employees may strike legally.
Under most statutes, strikes which impose a significant risk to the public
safety, health, or welfare can be enjoined.14
Statutory grants of the right to strike typically exclude "essential"
public employees. The "essential" nature of a service is legislatively
determined, resulting in a variety of exceptions, including bans on strikes
by correctional and hospital personnel, guards at prisons and mental
facilities, and court personnel.3"
Most statutes prohibit fire fighters and police officers from striking.
The exclusion of these categories of employees from the strike grant is
justified because "the probability that a strike will result in immediate
danger to public health and safety is so substantial that strikes are
almost invariably inappropriate. ' 3 6 In contrast, no state statute includes
teachers in the category of "essential" public employees. The Illinois
statute expressly grants teachers the right to strike.3 7 In states which
broadly grant public employees the right to strike, except for "essential"
categories of employees, teachers are allowed to participate in strike
actions. 8
Constitutional Right to Strike
Prohibitions against strikes by public employees have been challenged
on almost every conceivable basis.39 The question of whether a strike
33. The ten states are Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
34. See Alaska Stat. §§ 23.40.070-23.40.260 (1986); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 89-1 to -20
(1976 & Supp. 1984); Illinois Public Labor Relations Act §§ 1-27, 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 48,
paras. 1601-27 (Smith-Hurd 1986) (public employees generally), Illinois Educational
Labor Relations Act §§ 1-21, I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, paras. 1701-21 (Smith-Hurd 1986)
(educational employees); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 179A.01-.25 (West Supp. 1987); Mont. Code
Ann. §§ 39-31-101 to 39-31-409 (1985); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 243.650-.782 (1986), Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1986); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §§ 1721-
35 (1978 & Supp. 1985) (municipal employees); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 111.70-.97 (West
1974 & Supp. 1986).
35. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 23.40.200 (1986) and Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 1101.1001
(Purdon Supp. 1986).
36. Burton and Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees,
79 Yale L.J. 418, 437 (1970).
37. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act §§ 1-21, I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, paras.
1701-21 (Smith-Hurd 1986).
38. Id.
39. First amendment challenges: Board of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed'n of Teachers
Local No. 886, 46 I11. 2d 439, 264 N.E.2d 18 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904, 91 S.
Ct. 2203 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 I11. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965);
Jefferson County Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 463 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1970), cert.
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ban could be justified provoked a vigorous debate in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. ° The Sovereignty Doctrine became untenable in the face
of a recognized constitutional right to organize.4 1 Since the right to strike
seemed intimately related to the fundamental right to form labor unions,
it was argued that a . ban on the right to strike violated the first
amendment. 42
Despite scholarly attacks, no court prior to 1985 had upheld the
right of public employees to strike in the absence of statutory author-
ization. The Supreme Court of California was the first to recognize that
the right to strike rose to the level of a basic civil liberty. In County
Sanitation District No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Association
Local 660,4 3 the sanitation district sued the public employees' union
seeking damages for an allegedly unlawful strike. The court held that
the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, which specifically prohibited strikes by
fire fighters, did not prohibit work stoppages by county and municipal
employees. The court thus decided that strikes to enhance bargaining
demands may be conducted by such governmental employees, unless
they "pose an imminent threat to public health or safety." Rejecting
denied, 404 U.S. 865, 92 S. Ct. 75 (1971); School Dist. for City of Holland v. Holland
Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968); Rogoff v. Anderson, 34 A.D. 2d
154, 310 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1970); State v. Heath, 177 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1970); Abbott v.
Myers, 20 Ohio App. 2d 65, 251 N.E.2d 869 (1969); City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket
Teachers' Alliance Local 930, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958); City of Wauwatosa v.
King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 182 N.W.2d 530 (1971); Regents v. Teaching Assistants' Ass'n,
74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2049 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1970).
Thirteenth amendment challenges: City of Evanston v. Buick, 421 F.2d 595 (7th Cir.
1970); Pinellas County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Pub. Instr., 214 So. 2d
34 (Fla. 1968); SchoolDist. for Holland, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206; In re Block,
50 N.J. 494, 236 A.2d 589 (1967).
Fourteenth amendment challenges: Jefferson County Teachers' Ass'n, 463 S.W.2d 627;
School Dist. for City of Holland, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206; In re Block, 50 N.J.
494, 236 A.2d 589; City of New York v. De Lury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 243 N.E.2d 128
(1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 455, 89 S. Ct. 1223 (1969); Abbott, 20 Ohio App. 2d
65, 251 N.E.2d 869.
Bill of Attainder challenges: Di Maggio v. Brown, 19 N.Y.2d 283, 225 N.E.2d 871
(1967); Abbott, 20 Ohio App. 2d 65, 251 N.E.2d 869.
40. Dripps, New Directions for the Regulation of Public Employee Strikes, 60 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 590, 595 (1985).
41. The court in United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 253 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.
1971), stated in dictum that the postal workers enjoyed a first amendment associational
right to form and join their own labor organization. Other courts have agreed. AFSCME
v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137, 140 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287,
288 (7th Cir. 1968). Courts have not, however, imposed any constitutional duty on public
employers to bargain collectively with workers who elect to organize. Indianapolis Educ.
Ass'n v. Lewallen, 72 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2071, 2072 (7th Cir. 1969). Most courts have
found that such a duty to bargain is purely a matter of statutory implication.
42. See United Fed'n of Postal Clerks, 325 F. Supp. at 885 (Wright, J., concurring).
43. 38 Cal. 3d 564, 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1985).
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the prior common law decisions pertaining to this subject, the court
said that "the right to strike, as an important symbol of a free society,
should not be denied unless such a strike would substantially injure
paramount interests of the larger community.""
In rejecting the traditional arguments against public employee strikes,
the court decided that the sovereignty concept was a vestige from another
era when the "King could do no wrong." The second justification, that
public employers are powerless to respond to strike pressure because
the terms of employment are fixed by the legislature, was inapplicable
in California where most terms are arrived at through collective bar-
gaining, a right granted to public employees by statute. The court next
determined that little empirical evidence supported the argument that
governments generally capitulate to unreasonable demands by public
employees in order to resolve strikes. Particularly unsupportable was the
underlying assumption of the argument that all government services are
essential. The court stated that "the absence of an unavoidable nexus
between most public services and essentiality necessarily undercuts the
notion that public officials will be forced to settle strikes quickly and
at any cost." ' 4 Finally, the notion that the essential nature of government
services renders their interruption unacceptable was rejected on the basis
that strikes by private employees are tolerated in many of the same
areas in which government is engaged, such as health, transportation,
and education.
LEGALITY OF STRIKES BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN LOUISIANA
The County Sanitation opinion reflects the growing opinion of legal
commentators that distinctions formerly made 'between the rights of
private and public employees to strike are no longer justifiable. 46 A
Louisiana court considered the legal status of striking public police
officers in 1979 and established the only guidelines applicable to deter-
mining whether striking teachers may be dismissed. Louisiana presently
has no legislative enactment concerning public employee strikes, and
prior to City of New Orleans v. Police Association47 no Louisiana
44. Id. at 584, 699 P.2d at 848, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
45. Id. at 577-78, 699 P.2d at 844, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
46. See, for example, R. Vaughn, Principles of Civil Service Law § 9.4 (1976);
Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 459
(1971); Burton, Can Public Employees Be Given the Right to Strike?, 21 Lab. L.J. 472
(1970); Haemmel, Government Employees and the Right to Strike-The Final Necessary
Step, 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 75 (1971); Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 Mich. L.
Rev. 931 (1969); Comment, The Strike and Its Alternatives: The Public Employment
Experience, 63 Ky. L.J. 430 (1975); Comment, Prohibition Revisited: The Strike Ban in
Public Employment, 1969 Wis. L. Rev. 930 (1969).
47. 369 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
1342 [Vol. 47
COMMENTS
appellate court had decided the question of whether public employee
strikes are legal.
City of New Orleans initially noted that courts in states which had
no statute governing public employee strikes had consistently prohibited
such strikes. Rather than apply the traditional rule, however, the court
expressly based its holding that police strikes were illegal and could be
enjoined on the fact that the withdrawal of law enforcement cannot be
tolerated by society. Police strikes are a threat to society's peaceful
existence and must be prohibited. In contrast, the court noted that
"[slociety can tolerate the temporary closing of a museum.'"'4
The court's review of the legal literature included several commen-
tators critical of the common law distinction between public and private
employees' right to strike. 49 While arguing for the right to strike by
public employees in occupations less essential to the continuation of a
civilized society, the commentators were in agreement that police and
fire employee strikes invariably result in immediate danger to the public
and must continue to be prohibited. The court's refusal to rule on the
legality of public employee strikes in general was probably strongly
influenced by the arguments against the prohibition reflected in the
academic arena. The California court in County Sanitation drew heavily
from these same articles to reach its decision that the right to strike is
a basic civil liberty not to be denied in the absence of a threat to the
public health and safety. 50
City of New Orleans left unanswered the question of the right of
other public employees to strike, thereby creating the inference that
strikes by less essential employees may not be prohibited. However, it
also failed to provide guidelines for determining the legality of other
types of employee strikes. Louisiana courts could find that public policy
dictates the prohibition of strikes by the same public employees declared
''essential" in other states.5
A teachers' strike would not be considered as threatening to the
health and welfare of the community as a police or firemen's strike.
Since days missed during a school closure are required by law to be
made up, teacher unions have argued that the children's education is
not endangered.5 2 But if a strike lengthened beyond the time available
for making up missed days, an injunction could conceivably be granted
under City of New Orleans. Significantly, that court felt it necessary
48. Id. at 190.
49. See sources cited in supra note 47.
50. 699 P.2d at 841 n.18.
51. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
52. See D. Colton and E. Graber, supra note 16, at 84: "One of the unique features




to declare strikes by policemen illegal in order to find that the injunction
was properly granted. Even if a prolonged teacher work stoppage met
the "essentiality" test, it would be difficult to declare all strikes by
teachers illegal.
Dicta in a recent Louisiana opinion appears to apply a presumption
that teacher strikes are not prohibited. In St. John the Baptist Parish
Association of Educators v. St. John the Baptist Parish School Board,"
school employees who had been laid off pursuant to a school board
reduction in the work force sought reinstatement and restoration of lost
benefits. The employees alleged that their dismissal was actually a direct
reprisal against them for participation in .a strike earlier that year. The
board had agreed as part of a negotiated contract that any later reduction
in the work force would reflect the actual seniority of the employees.
When a reduction in the size of the force became necessary, the board
ranked employees by favoring first those employees who did not strike,
followed by employees who returned to work during the strike, and
finally those who returned at the end of the strike.
In its factual summary, the St. John court stated: "Appellants
engaged in a lawful strike and work stoppage against the Board ...
-14 No issue was raised regarding any threat to the health and safety
of the public caused by the strike. Instead, the court dealt with the
case strictly as one in contract law and held that the board had violated
the terms of the contract prohibiting reprisals. The board. was ordered
to reinstate the former strikers and to revise its seniority lists.
The superintendent in St. John had attempted to break the strike
by notifying the strikers that their positions would be declared vacant
and considered abandoned. In light of the court's declaration that the
work stoppage was not illegal, the superintendent probably could not
have justified dismissal of the striking employees under a charge of
willful neglect of duty." Furthermore, a reviewing court would almost
certainly hold that the notification letter sent by the superintendent failed
to sufficiently comply with the Tenure Act's requirements. A teacher
must be found guilty of willful neglect of duty in a full hearing before
the board before her dismissal can be effected. No presumption of
abandonment can be applied under the Act where the effect of the
presumption would be a dismissal for a cause not enumerated.
If the board had interpreted the strikers' failure to return to work
on the specified day as a tacit resignation, the Tenure Act would not
have been triggered. However, the obvious interest in employment dis-
played by striking teachers seeking improved work conditions would
have precluded the board from finding an intent to resign.
53. 494 So. 2d 553 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
54. Id. at 555.
55. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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COMMENTS
DIsMIssAL OF STRIKING EMPLOYEES FOR WILLFUL NEGLECT OF DUTY
The following discussion attempts to define the parameters of com-
peting interests which necessarily become involved whenever a labor
dispute is transferred from the negotiating table to the courtroom.
6
Whereas negotiations concern the underlying issues of work or salary
conditions, the judge's concern is to determine and apply the law. Thus,
the major consideration in a courtroom where striking teachers are
appealing a dismissal based on willful neglect of duty should be the
extent of the school board's power to take the action and what, if any,
limitations on that power are imposed from other sources. The legality
of a strike under state law is a central consideration in upholding a
board's dismissal of striking teachers.
In general, where teachers have gone on strike in violation of a
specific prohibition, courts have upheld later dismissals as reasonable
exercises of the board's duty to preserve the school system. In Hortonville
Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Association,"7 teach-
ers who had been discharged by the school board for engaging in a
strike prohibited by state law sued the school board, alleging that their
dismissal violated due process. On March 18, 1974, the Hortonville
teachers went on strike. On March 20, the superintendent sent all teachers
a letter inviting them to return to work. On March 23, he sent the 86
teachers who were still on strike a letter asking them to return and
reminding them that strikes by public employees were illegal. Finally,
the board decided to conduct disciplinary hearings for each of the striking
teachers and sent individual notices of the hearing date.
Counsel for the teachers argued that the board was not sufficiently
impartial to exercise discipline over the striking teachers as required by
the due process clause, since the board provoked the strike through its
failure to meet the teachers' demands. The next day, the board ter-
minated their employment. The teachers then filed suit urging the due
process violation. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed a trial court
grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the school board
and held that due process required that the teachers' conduct and the
board's response be evaluated by an impartial decision-maker.
The sole issue presented before the United States Supreme Court
was whether the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibited the Hortonville School Board from making the decision to dismiss
teachers admittedly on strike and persistently refusing to return to their
duties. The Court held that the school board members did not have
such a personal or official stake in their decision to dismiss striking
56. See D. Colton and E. Graber, supra note 16, at 95 (discussing judges as decision-
makers).
57. 426 U.S. 482, 96 S. Ct. 2308 (1976).
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teachers so as to disqualify them, on due process grounds, from making
their determination. The Court rejected the argument that the board
was biased because it had negotiated with the teachers and instead held
that the board had retained the power to decide that the public interest
in maintaining uninterrupted classroom work required that teachers strik-
ing in violation of state law be discharged. The Court deemed the critical
issue to be whether the teachers were, in fact, engaged in an unlawful
strike-a fact the teachers admitted. In defining the property right of
which the teachers had allegedly been deprived by the board's biased
decision-making process, the Court accepted the teachers' contention
that they had been deprived of "the expectation that the jobs they had
left to go and remain on strike in violation of law would remain open
to them.''58
The Court characterized the governmental interest at stake in the
case as one of broad discretionary power. The board's decision "was
not an adjudicative decision, for the Board had an obligation to [decide]
an important question of policy: What choice among the alternative
responses to the teachers' strike will best serve the interests of the school
system, the-interests of the parents and children who depend on the
system, and the interests of the citizens whose taxes support it?" 9 Thus
the board's decision was only incidentally a disciplinary one. By per-
mitting the board to make the decision to dismiss striking teachers, the
Court chose to leave the balance of power in labor relations where the
state law vested it through the statutory grant of power to the board
to hire and fire employees.
Had Wisconsin statutorily protected the teachers' right to strike, the
board's broad power to deal with teacher strikes would have been
modified by the legislature's concurrent expression of state policy that
such strikes should be dealt with through the negotiation process. The
power of the board to choose from a broad array of alternatives,
including dismissal, in ending the strike is circumscribed when a state
has deliberately protected public employee strikers. In California, for
example, where public employee strikes are neither illegal nor tortious,
the exclusive power of the board to hire and fire comes into direct
conflict with the perception that the right to strike is a "basic civil
liberty." A California school board's exercise of its power to dismiss
striking workers possibly subjects the board to a valid due process claim
under state law. In contrast, since Louisiana jurisprudence has not clearly
expressed a policy of protecting striking public workers, the dismissal
power of school boards might not conflict with a basic civil liberty.




An Illinois case, Battle v. Illinois Civil Service Commission,60 further
illustrates the interplay between public policy and the power of the
employer to dismiss. In Battle, twenty-two municipal workers challenged
their dismissal for participating in an illegal strike, failing to report for
work for five consecutive days, and withholding of services. The plaintiffs
claimed that striking could not constitute cause for discharge of public
employees absent a specific Illinois Department of Labor rule to that
effect. In holding that the lower court's order of dismissal was properly
issued, the court stated that '[public] employees have no protected
right to engage in a strike' and that 'unauthorized absence from em-
ployment due to participation in a work stoppage was cause for dis-
charge."''6' Notice of the illegality of the strike was not necessary, the
court determined, when the jurisprudence consistently had held that no
right to strike existed.
The court defined "cause" as "some substantial shortcoming which
renders an employee's continuation in office detrimental to the discipline
and efficiency of the service and which law and public policy recognize
as good cause for dismissal."' 62 The public policy prohibiting public
employee strikes thus served as a modification upon the power granted
by law to the state agency to dismiss for "cause." Had the state of
Illinois been among the minority of states which have recognized a
limited right to strike, it is logical that this ground for dismissal would
be removed from the recognized list of "good causes" regardless of the
extent to which the striking employee's continued employment was "det-
rimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service."
'63
EFFECT OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE ON THE "ARBITRARY" STANDARD
The language in St. John could be interpreted as a judicial policy
determination that teacher strikes do not present dangers to society
comparable to police strikes. It must be determined to what extent a
court reviewing a dismissal action against striking teachers would favor
the rights of individuals over the board's exclusive power to dismiss for
willful neglect of duty.
In Landry v. Ascension Parish School Board,64 a tenured teacher
who had been dismissed for willful neglect of duty was ordered reinstated
with back pay. The teacher had been threatened by a student carrying
a two-by-four, and, in fear for his life, the teacher ran to his car in
60. 78 Ill. App. 3d 828, 396 N.E.2d 1321 (1979).
61. Id. at 1325 (quoting Strobeck v. Illinois Civil Service Comm'n, 70 II1. App. 3d
772, 778, 388 N.E.2d 912, 917 (1979)).
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. 415 So. 2d 473 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
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the parking lot, unlocked it, and retrieved a pistol. He stood with his
back to the car and the pistol at his side as a crowd of angry students
approached him. The teacher was notified shortly after the incident that
a dismissal hearing would be held.
The board conceded that no regulation was violated by the acts of
the teacher, but dismissed him because he should have known, by the
nature of his position, that his acts could not be condoned. The teacher
was also tried and convicted of the crime of aggravated assault by the
trial court, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed his conviction on
appeal.65
On appeal of the district court decision ordering the teacher rein-
stated, the board contended that the mere vindication of the teacher on
the criminal charge against him did not place his actions within the
range of acceptable conduct for one in his position. Further, the board
urged that the teacher's deviation from the board's concept of acceptable
behavior amounted to a "willful neglect of duty."
In affirming the order of reinstatement, the court accepted the
teacher's argument that because he has a constitutional right to keep
and bear arms, subject to some regulations, it was unreasonable and
arbitrary for the board to deny him the right to self-defense under the
circumstances. The appellate court also apparently accepted the district
court's holding that the teacher's discharge constituted policy making
which was arguably both ex post facto and punitive in nature. Where
the record reflected no violation of a rule, regulation, or policy of the
board, the teacher's right to defend himself precluded the board's as-
sertion of a rational basis for his dismissal.
Applying the court's reasoning to a dismissal of a striking teacher,
several distinctions may be made. First, a school board probably has a
policy regulating the conditions under which an employee may be absent
from his duties. Thus, a rational basis for dismissal is more likely to
be found in this context. Second, no Louisiana court has held that the
right to strike is fundamental. Whether a reviewing court will consider
the factors set forth in City of New Orleans finding a school board
dismissal action to be arbitrary when determining whether a strike may
be enjoined is an open question.
The fact that individual competing interests were considered by the
court in Landry suggests that the legality of a strike may be a factor
in a court's determination of a board's rational basis. The right to strike
is being developed jurisprudentially in Louisiana, and courts appear to
be rejecting the common law prohibition in favor of the more modern
65. State v. Landry, 381 So. 2d 462 (La. 1980). The reversal was based on the court's




qualified right to strike. The presence of the fact that a board could
not have obtained an injunction against striking workers would probably
influence a court reviewing dismissals. If a board has no power to make
teachers stop striking, then it should not have the power to take punitive
measures.
CONCLUSION
The recent St. John decision, indicating that a work stoppage by
teachers was "legal," raises the question of the extent of a school
board's power to dismiss striking teachers for willful neglect of duty.
Where a board complies with the Tenure Act requirements for notice
and a hearing, such a dismissal appears to be within its statutory power
as the exclusive determiner of employee hiring and dismissal, absent a
grant to teachers of the right to strike.
It is unclear to what extent a reviewing court might consider the
protection of the right to strike as a factor when examining a board's
rational basis for dismissals. In at least one case, where the teacher
acted pursuant to constitutional rights, the court had no difficulty in
weighing the teacher's rights against the board's finding of policy vi-
olations. A board's dismissal will be considered arbitrary at least to the
extent it contravenes the teacher's constitutional rights. In the future,
the argument that the right to strike is a basic civil liberty may be
accepted as valid by a Louisiana court reviewing board dismissals of
striking teachers.
Since few Louisiana cases have been decided on the right of public
employees to strike, it is difficult to confidently predict the direction
the courts will take regarding subsequent dismissals. The courts could
follow one of two approaches. They could apply the City of New Orleans
rationale, using an injunction ordering employees to stop striking, or a
threat of dismissal if the teachers refuse to return to work. Both in-
junctions and dismissals produce similar results-the return to normalcy
at the expense of the strikers' bargaining power. If the courts will
protect nonessential employees from the injunctive process, they should
likewise recognize that the threat of dismissal serves a similar purpose
and effectively gives a school board an unfair advantage. The ability
to threaten dismissal discourages school boards from making good faith
efforts to improve employee relations with management. Where the days
of absence can be rescheduled and no harm is likely to result from the
strike, it seems inappropriate for a court to interfere with bona fide
labor disputes by upholding such a powerful weapon for management
as the mass firing of teachers. involved in a concerted work stoppage.
The second possible approach of the courts could be the upholding
of a school board's right to manage its affairs in the best interests of
the community. Without the discretionary ability to fashion remedies,
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a school board could never deal effectively with the infinite variety of
labor situations which may arise. Usually, a school board would only
choose to resolve a strike by using the dismissal option as a last resort.
The public outcry likely to follow from such a perceived injustice would
negate the benefits of continuing school with new employees. The second
approach would reflect the courts' hesitancy to regulate labor disputes
in absence of legislative guidance. Since public employees' right to strike
is still ill-defined, the affirmation of teacher dismissals on grounds of
willful neglect of duty as a valid exercise of the school board's exclusive
power to hire and dismiss is the approach more consistent with the
intent of the legislature.
Janet Resetar
